Maduro’s capture not only challenges China’s influence in Latin America but also signals a bolder US security posture that could reshuffle great-power competition
We had barely entered the new year when Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, were captured in a brazen raid on the orders of US President Donald Trump. In the early hours of January 3, the couple were taken from their residence in Caracas, Venezuela, and flown to the US in a military operation impeccably executed in the name of countering narcoterrorism.
Beijing, for one, was “deeply shocked” by Washington’s “hegemonic behaviour” and strongly condemned it. At a UN Security Council emergency meeting, the Chinese representative called the US move “unilateral, illegal and bullying”.
Following Maduro’s abduction, Trump said the US would “run” the country for the time being. This includes taking control of the country’s rich oil resources.
He has also been busy making threats. He warned Colombian President Gustavo Petro to “watch his a**”. He said Cuba “literally is ready to fall” without Venezuelan oil and that the US would “have to do something with Mexico” because “the [drug] cartels are very strong” there. He also reiterated his desire to annex Greenland, saying “we do need Greenland, absolutely”.
China’s feeling of shock is understandable, as are the similar reactions across the globe, from Washington’s foes and friends alike.
Few likely expected Trump to go this far to advance his disdain of international protocols, although he is known to be mercurial. Incidentally, even his loyal and trusted chief of staff Susie Wiles described him as having an “alcoholic’s personality”.
However, all the ensuing indignation and unease are eclipsed by the realisation that Operation Absolute Resolve had been foretold by the US’ 2025 National Security Strategy, released late last year, in which the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” was already proclaimed, sounding now like a footnote written in advance and meant precisely for the raid in Caracas.
Trump has since coined a new term for the updated Monroe Doctrine: the “Donroe Doctrine”. Those who are familiar with the mafia dons of The Godfather film series may feel chills.
This doctrine has two ramifications. One is the collapse of the so-called liberal international order as defined and advocated by Princeton University professor G. John Ikenberry, a leading political scientist whose “Liberal Leviathan” proposition stands for the US embedding itself in global rules and institutions to constrain its own power and reassure states of lesser power.
The Donroe Doctrine exposes the degeneration of the world into the international version of the Hobbesian Leviathan, harking back to the pre-Westphalian Europe of a proverbial “might makes right” jungle. Alternatively, one may simply call this doctrine a revival of old-fashioned imperialism.
The other ramification is the policy’s impact on US-China rivalry.
To some, as the designated “near-peer” rival in Washington’s latest National Security Strategy, Beijing was humiliated by the Maduro capture as China’s special representative on Latin American affairs met Maduro hours before his seizure by American soldiers. China could potentially suffer billions of dollars in investment losses as Trump moves to secure Venezuela’s energy assets against Chinese and Russian influences.
There are also those who pointed to Taiwan, raising the possibility of Beijing copying the Maduro capture model in potential decapitation strike plans against pro-independence figures on the island. Some are worried about such a copycat move, yet others are advocating it.
All this, however, pales before the larger implications for the relationship. Bilateral relations between the two countries have seemingly been granted a reprieve since President Xi Jinping met Trump in Busan, South Korea, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit last October.
The danger is that, while the US is carrying out the Donroe Doctrine and the US State Department posts “This is OUR Hemisphere” on X, formerly known as Twitter, the US will seek to deter China in East Asia. While the US National Security Strategy cites the western hemisphere as its top concern, “deterring a conflict over Taiwan” is also a priority.
Beijing, of course, won’t stand for any interference.
This poses the problem described by University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer in his masterpiece, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. As a foundational part of his theory of offensive realism, a global power in this anarchical world endeavours to secure and maintain dominance over its own perceived backyard while making sure that no rival power dominates another region because that rival power, once entrenched, can use its regional base to launch a drive to compete for global hegemony, too.
Beijing surely represents that rival power in its near region in Washington’s eyes but China is determined to assert itself. Therefore, in the wake of Maduro’s capture, what is at stake for Beijing far exceeds bean-counting about investment losses in Venezuela or, for that matter, in Latin America.
It’s Beijing’s determination to defy the US in great power politics, as Mearsheimer would put it, that matters. For Beijing, therefore, the issue is no longer just about Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China; it’s about the country’s supremacy in East Asia, as attested by its latest military drills around the island, conducted just days ahead of Washington’s action in Venezuela, and by Beijing’s toughening up on Japan.
Thus, 2026 has started off on a note of ominous fluidity, even with the prospect of Trump visiting Beijing in April and three more opportunities for bilateral summits down the road, as US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has counted in earnest.
