Middle powers fear a return to ‘rules of the jungle’ geopolitics as rival powers carve out spheres of influence
America’s capture of Venezuelan strongman Nicolas Maduro in a special operation sent shock waves across the world. With characteristically bombastic rhetoric, US President Donald Trump hailed Operation Absolute Resolve as “an assault like people have not seen since World War II” and “one of the most stunning, effective and powerful displays of American military might” in history.
His deputies were quick to add that the operation also showed the long arm of the US justice system by accusing Maduro of involvement in drug trafficking, aside from the systematic oppression of democratic forces. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio even painted the event as a liberation of Venezuela from Cuban intelligence forces, who were heavily embedded in the Maduro regime.
The response from much of the world, however, was muted, if not critical. Beijing, Tehran and Moscow predictably condemned the abduction, but so did key US allies who have been critical of the Maduro regime.
“These actions constitute a dangerous precedent for peace, regional security and pose a risk to the civil population,” said Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and four other key Latin American leaders in a joint statement. “We reiterate that the situation in Venezuela must be resolved exclusively through dialogue […] without interference and adhering to international law.”
European leaders from Paris to London also emphasised the importance of international law, a subtle criticism. Crucially, even frontline US allies such as the Philippines struck a critical note. Manila’s statement stressed “the relevant principles of international law, including the independence and sovereign equality of states … and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states”.
While wary of alienating Washington, middle powers are deeply worried about the dangerous precedent and, more broadly, the collapse of long-time efforts to create a rules-based international order. As this year’s chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Philippines has a special responsibility to coordinate a diplomatic response to strengthen the foundations of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite its tactical sophistication and shock-and-awe effect, the broader strategic implications and legal justification for Maduro’s capture remain unclear. With the exception of Maduro and his immediate security personnel, who were neutralised by US special forces, much of the Chavismo regime is still in place. Trump has claimed America would “run the country” via a pliable regime in Caracas and effectively take control of Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest known on earth.
The post-Maduro regime, however, has shown no sign of a radical policy shift. If anything, the newly installed president, Delcy Rodriguez, has struck a defiant note and been seen warmly greeting representatives from the traditional allies of Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. There are also signs that America’s “gunboat diplomacy” may have its limits, with massive oil tankers recently bypassing the US naval blockade off the coast of Venezuela.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties in Venezuela, the circumstances and broader strategic implications of America’s military operation trouble Asian middle powers. Critical of the authoritarian Maduro regime and worried about alienating America, middle powers in the Asia-Pacific have hedged their responses.
Australia and New Zealand have avoided direct criticism but categorically emphasised the importance of international law. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest nation, similarly emphasised “dialogue and self-restraint” and underscored the importance of “fully respect[ing] international law, including the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and international humanitarian law”.
Though the key US allies of Japan and South Korea have so far tiptoed around the issue, they are likely to be coordinating a response with other regional middle powers. Here enters the Philippines, uniquely positioned to coordinate a joint diplomatic response by regional middle powers in favour of a rules-based international order.
As Asean chair, Manila has the prerogative to determine the regional policy agenda. It can also unilaterally issue a chairman’s statement in the absence of consensus among member states. As the host of corollary pan-regional platforms, most notably the East Asia Summit and Asean Regional Forum, the Philippines can also steer dialogue in support of international law and a democratic and peaceful transition in Venezuela – just short of directly confronting the Trump administration.
For frontline US allies and middle powers such as the Philippines, a rules-based order is an existential issue. Manila has held former president Rodrigo Duterte accountable for human rights violations under the auspices of the International Criminal Court and defends its sovereign rights in the South China Sea under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Middle powers in Asia are also concerned about the dangerous precedent set by America. In particular, they worry about the possibility of rival powers creating their own “Donroe Doctrine”-style spheres of influence and “capturing” the heads of much weaker states deemed unfriendly neighbours, whether in Taipei, Kyiv or even Manila.
Muslim-majority middle powers such as Indonesia are also worried about the US potentially attempting similar operations against unfriendly regimes in the Middle East – a sensitive issue for the hundreds of millions of Muslims in Asia.
Ultimately, Asian middle powers fear the return of “rule of the jungle” geopolitics that could chip away at collective post-war efforts to build some semblance of a rules-based order, one that rests on the principles of international law, dialogue-driven norms of behaviour and institutionalised diplomacy via multilateral organisations – such as Asean.
