- There is speculation over whether the Quad can become a united, Nato-like bloc when its members are so dependent on China economically and India might be its Achilles’ heel
- But if Biden succeeds in expanding alliances, particularly in Southeast Asia, the Quad strategy might work
US President Joe Biden has instructed the Pentagon to review America’s China-related strategy to meet challenges in the Indo-Pacific. The establishment of a China task force to revise US capabilities in Asia signifies the huge importance Washington attaches to China and the Indo-Pacific. The European Union has also been ramping up its policy planning for the region, with Germany, France and the Netherlands taking the lead.
The US’ first freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea during Biden’s term came just over two weeks after his inauguration, compared to four months for Donald Trump. Trump waited even longer for his first Taiwan Strait pass – Biden took just two weeks.
Then, on February 9, in a clear demonstration of the seriousness of the new administration’s intentions to maintain a “tough posture” towards Beijing, the US navy held a rare dual-aircraft-carrier exercise in the South China Sea, only its third since 2012.
One outcome of the US redistribution of force might be the redirection of resources from the Middle East to Asia. Much depends on how the US formulates its Iran strategy, which has been ambiguous since Trump withdrew the US from the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Meanwhile, Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin has placed the Indo-Pacific and “the chief pacing challenge” of China in the spotlight of long-term military planning. And National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has said the “Quad” framework will play a key role in the US’ Indo-Pacific policy. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – revived in 2017 in response to China’s rise – is already seen by Beijing as an anti-China alliance or an “Asian Nato”.
The first Quad ministerial meeting took place in September 2019 in New York, followed by a second gathering in Tokyo last October, where then-secretary of state Mike Pompeo called on the group to rally against Chinese “exploitation, corruption and coercion”.
Last November, despite the Covid-19 pandemic and deadly China-India border tensions, all four Quad members – Japan, the US, India and Australia – joined together for the Malabar naval exercise. It was the first time since 2007 that Australia had joined the Indian-led exercise and, significantly, happened amid an escalating trade war with Beijing.
As concerns dovetail over Beijing’s growing clout in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad is working towards its first-ever summit of leaders. This would bring the bloc closer to institutionalisation, a plan that was reaffirmed after Sullivan said the Quad should be a “foundation upon which to build substantial American policy in the Indo-Pacific region”.
Beyond the Quad, the US has been bolstering its regional security alliance network to counter China – it plans to renew its Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines, which would allow US troops to be stationed there, amid growing regional wariness of China’s newly adopted coastguard law.
On the other side is China, also summoning its partners against the US-led coalition. China is teaming up with Russia and Iran, which are also facing criticism from the US and its allies over their foreign policy ambitions. Most recently, on February 15, all three faced criticism from a coalition of 58 states, launched by Canada, against “hostage diplomacy”.
In December 2019, Moscow, Tehran and Beijing conducted their first joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman, which Iranian state television dubbed “the new triangle of power in the sea”. Russian state media emphasised that the trio shared an opposition to US hegemony.
After Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, sanctions were again imposed on Tehran, forcing it to turn to Russia and China. That same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced support for Iran’s status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a China-led Eurasian pact, to be upgraded from observer to full member.
A year later, Beijing and Tehran decided to upgrade their relations to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” and are currently studying a US$400 billion economic deal.
This week, Russia and Iran kicked off a joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, with India also joining and China to follow, four years after Russia and China held a joint military exercise in the South China Sea for the first time.
There has been speculation over the Quad’s capability to become a united, Nato-like bloc when its members are so dependent on China economically. While recent trade wars between China and Quad members the US and Australia show that national interests still take priority, the Quad is far from perfect and India might prove to be its Achilles’ heel.
India’s trade with China is declining despite hopes of surpassing a milestone of US$100 billion. New Delhi, which joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2017, also has to balance its relations within that grouping against its Quad ties. It is hoping to restart discussions with Iran over development of the strategically important Chabahar port, which were halted after the US resumed sanctions on Iran.
Despite the Quad’s weaknesses, however, it still holds out the promise of curbing China on a multilateral front. As Biden rebuilds alliances, the Quad mechanism may prove to be more effective and palpable, especially if new partnerships are explored, including with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
“Extreme competition” will increase with new local encounters, but a war in the Indo-Pacific looks very unlikely, given that all the actors involved have proven their ability many times to exercise restraint – whether it is between the US and Iran, China and India, the US and Russia, or the US and China. Every player values strategic and economic stability in a region that constitutes a major part of the world’s maritime trade.
