While France and the EU have raged against the deal, it is in Southeast Asia where its geopolitical impact will be felt the most
The potential presence of nuclear submarines in Southeast Asian waters has rekindled fears of the region being a theatre for great power competition
Winston Churchill famously complained during World War II that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them”. US President Joe Biden might be harbouring similar thoughts these days as Washington tries to corral its allies in response to China’s rise.
The ruckus over the new Aukus alliance between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, which drew an outraged response from France, is the latest manifestation of divides within the West.
But it’s in Southeast Asia where the geopolitical impact will be felt the most. If anything, the divergent responses from Southeast Asian nations has revealed the difficulties of assembling an “Asian Nato” against China.
Washington appears to have underestimated the anger from Paris over the nuclear submarine agreement. A similarly spirited response from the European Union, which called for an apology from Australia, also exposed some lingering resentment in transatlantic relations.
However, the stakes are just as high for members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), which have responded with a mixture of anger, bewilderment and uneasy approval.
There are three reasons Aukus is a major development for the region. First, any Australia nuclear submarine is likely to be deployed to hotly contested waters such as the South China Sea, where multiple Southeast Asian countries are at loggerheads with China.
Although they can traverse vast oceans and remain largely stealthy in deep waters, nuclear submarines run on highly enriched uranium, which could be deployed for nuclear weapons development. This raises concerns over Asean’s Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone treaty.
One should bear in mind that Asean was established in the thick of the Cold War, just after the Cuban missile crisis. The regional body’s founding members fretted over the possibility that Southeast Asia could turn into a depository for nuclear weapons or even an apocalyptic site of nuclear brinkmanship among superpowers.
Australia has tried to reassure the region that its “staunch” commitment to nuclear non-proliferation remains “steadfast”. But this brings up the second major concern over Aukus, namely the fears that Southeast Asia might end up as a theatre of great power conflict.
Beginning in the 1970s, Asean members such as Malaysia have pushed for the creation of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, with the goal of preventing regional waters and lands from turning into a battlefield of external powers.
Traumatised by decades of war in Indochina and insurgencies across maritime Southeast Asia, Asean pushed for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which calls on all major regional players to seek peaceful, multilateral solutions to regional conflicts.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that Indonesia – the de facto leader of Asean – complained about Aukus and said it was “deeply concerned over the continuing arms race and power projection in the region”.
On a more fundamental level, Southeast Asian countries might see any US-backed military alliance in the Indo-Pacific as a threat to Asean centrality in shaping regional affairs.
Finally, the ruckus over Aukus has also exposed fault lines within Asean, including the three claimant states in the South China Sea. Malaysia, which adopted a tougher stance against China under Mahathir Mohamad’s administration, is now courting improved relations with Beijing under a new, more conservative leadership.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein has gone so far as stating that his country would rather speak to Beijing to “get the views of their leadership”. Notwithstanding maritime disputes with China, Malaysia prefers a more diplomatic response, given its heavy reliance on trade and investments with Beijing.
In the Philippines, Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin has openly backed the deal as he welcomed “enhancement of a near-abroad ally’s ability to project power” to “restore and keep the balance” of power in the region. In a thinly veiled reference to China, he warned of “threatening” behaviour and attempts to “challenge the status quo” in the South China Sea and broader region.
With Beijing-friendly Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte entering his final few months in office, and given the dearth of big-ticket Chinese investment so far, Manila has gradually pivoted back to its Western allies.
Vietnam, which has been quietly cultivating security cooperation with the US and other Western powers, took a much more nuanced position. While emphasising the importance of harnessing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Hanoi also underscored the need for all countries to “strive for the same goal of peace, stability, cooperation and development in the region and the world over”.
Vietnam might welcome any external assistance to balance against Beijing’s expanding naval footprint in the South China Sea, but it has not openly backed Aukus, to avoid antagonising China. For similar reasons, other regional states such as Singapore and Thailand have largely preferred strategic silence over the issue.
As it happens, the Biden administration’s attempts to mobilise like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific has only exposed divides among its allies as well as the reluctance of key Southeast Asian countries to openly align against China.
