. The narrative has served China well in gaining benefits from other countries, but appears increasingly untenable as Beijing seeks to be treated as an equal by the US
. The Biden administration is not naive when it comes to China and is prepared to respond to its challenges with realism rather than idealism
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China has long described itself as a victim of foreign aggression in what it terms the “century of humiliation”, which President Xi Jinping seeks to prevent from reoccurring by achieving the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.
The narrative of victimhood has served China well in its diplomatic strategies to gain benefits from other countries, as well as Beijing’s justification for conditional acceptance and selective modification of the existing rules-based order.
The strategy is increasingly untenable, however, as Beijing seeks to be treated as an equal by the United States and first among equals in the Asia-Pacific. This paradox of seeking great power status while challenging previously agreed rules indicates that some in Beijing feel the victimhood approach is too effective to give up.
Embracing the existing order and joining it as an equal to the US means accepting reciprocity and giving up the normative exemptions and rules-based exceptions on which China has thrived.
Gaining respect and equal treatment by the US is untenable however, while China fosters a closed, state-led economy where only “national champions” flourish, pervasive censorship stifles speech, societal controls instil fear and a secrecy-obsessed military and Communist Party apparatus thwart trust.
Likewise, it is untenable – when confronting China results in a diplomatic put-down or economic coercion – for anyone calling on China to hold itself accountable or alter its behaviour to address points of friction.
The victim strategy was on full display at the opening of the Anchorage meeting between the US and China. Granted, the first minutes of the talks which were open to the media were expected to be confrontational, with more pragmatic discussions anticipated behind closed doors once the cameras left.
However, the public session as well as post-meeting messaging highlight the wide gap in perception between the two sides. They affirmed that China is not ready to put aside its victim narrative and establish a relationship based on reciprocity.
China’s media and commentators argued from the outset that the US sanctioned Chinese officials before the meeting, setting a bad tone for talks and justifying a strong response by the indignant Chinese delegation.
Few expected the meeting would generate a breakthrough or reset the bilateral relationship. However, fewer expected the opening statements to become a metaphor for the wide philosophical gulf that separates the two countries’ approaches to one another and the international system.
China’s delegation leader Yang Jiechi relied on China’s old playbook, agreeing to rules – including two-minute opening remarks – then breaking them because perceived injustice made it necessary in his mind.
Amid China’s pressure to hold the high-level meeting, the US held its ground and met its allies first, chose the venue and negotiated ground rules and the agenda in advance with the Chinese side.
Had they agreed to talks in China, they would probably still have been subjected to rule-breaking filibustering and performative criticism. Yang asked his interpreter at the end of his uninterrupted 18-minute speech if it needed to be translated into English, leaving no doubt who his intended audience was.
Had they met in China, the US delegation would have been unable to respond or manage the media’s presence in the room.
China’s post-meeting media narrative that US was not a good host is part of the exception-seeking victim strategy. Yang was recorded leaving the meeting and stating he ate instant noodles for lunch.
This sparked outrage that he had subsisted on such meagre fare instead of being feted by his hosts, despite the fact the two sides agreed there would be no bilateral meals or banquets associated with the talks.
The victim strategy is enhanced by such perceived slights and injustices, laying the foundation for future requests for concessions to right past wrongs.
Lest we forget, the US defended Chinese sovereignty through it's century of humiliation
Adherence and accountability for rule- and norm-breaking will be a defining challenge for all of China’s partners, made all the more difficult by China’s victim-driven exceptionalism. Canada has borne the brunt of this dynamic with the 2018 arrest of two of its citizens in seeming retaliation for the arrest of Huawei’s chief financial officer, Meng Wanzhou, in Vancouver.
On the same day as the Anchorage talks, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau criticised China for blocking the Canadian embassy’s charge d’affaires from witnessing the one-day trial of Michael Spavor, despite a bilateral consular treaty granting Canada that right.
Likewise, free trade treaties have not stopped China from engaging in economic coercion against trading partners when political differences arise.
The Anchorage meeting provides some valuable insights into China’s approach to the bilateral relationship and the ability to reliably predict how it will develop during the Biden administration.
China will undoubtedly continue to highlight injustice and victimisation while at the same time insisting its power and correctness justify being treated as an equal, but with exceptions made for its unique conditions and history of victimisation, legitimising a relationship without reciprocity.
Anchorage proves the Biden administration is not naive when it comes to China. It is prepared to respond to its challenges with realism rather than idealism. It is not going to seek a “reset” or chase abstract notions of cooperation at the expense of other interests.
It has adopted a results-oriented mantra as the objective for engagement, eschewing the massive bilateral dialogues of the past which produced few meaningful, measurable or binding commitments.
The outcome of the talks – separate statements rather than a joint one – each describing the discussions, and announcing the consensus that a bilateral working group will be formed to address climate change, is indicative of the pragmatic, competitive approach to Beijing we can expect from Washington.
Behind the drama in Alaska, US-China relations are really the same old story
The latest high-level meeting had plenty of drama, but the plot is growing stale. Neither side’s opening position has changed much in the past decade
From China’s perspective, unless the US treats it with ‘respect’, relations won’t get much better
It’s been less than a week since the United States and China met in Anchorage, Alaska, their first high-level meeting after Joe Biden became president. Reports of a testy exchange quickly swept the media circuit, with implications that the relationship was deteriorating right in front of everyone’s eyes.
This was no ordinary diplomatic tête-à-tête. There was strong language instead of a banquet. No agreements were hammered out and there was nothing to sign or announce.
Despite the media blitz, none of this should come as a surprise. Both sides played to the camera in a made-for-TV-moment where Beijing, Washington, and their respective audiences back home got exactly what they wanted – an image of toughness and resolve. In that limited sense, the meeting was a complete success.
Things could have gone worse. The talks could have been cancelled at the last minute, either side could have refused to continue after the opening remarks, or diplomats could have been recalled from capitals in protest.
That would have sent an unambiguous message that tensions were not only rising, but that the relationship itself was fraying. Clearly, both sides saw that a managed diplomatic sparring match was better for their ratings than cancelling the show before airtime.
As expected, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken took a firm stance on human rights and political issues. He led with remarks on the US following a rules-based system. He went on to highlight the US’ “deep concerns with actions by China, including in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, cyber attacks on the United States”. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan added that US allies were also concerned about China’s actions.
Blinken and Sullivan’s comments were reportedly well received at the White House with a CNN correspondent tweeting: “Biden says he’s proud of his secretary of state after Blinken got into a heated back-and-forth with his Chinese counterpart during their first meeting yesterday.”
Meanwhile, China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, countered: “What China and the international community follow or uphold is the United Nations-centred international system…” Foreign Minister Wang Yi added that the US should “fully abandon the hegemonic practice of wilfully interfering in China’s internal affairs”.
China’s state news agency, Xinhua, lauded the Chinese delegates’ “strong response”, but still characterised the talks as “candid and constructive”. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said at a press briefing that the US “provoked the dispute in the first place, so the two sides had a strong smell of gunpowder and drama from the beginning in the opening remarks”.
This latest season of the US-China diplomacy show certainly has plenty of drama, but the plot is growing stale. Not much has changed in either sides’ opening positions over the past decade. These statements and retorts could have easily been made five or 10 years ago, with different actors playing the same parts.
None of the acrimony should have been a surprise, especially after Washington imposed sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials over the electoral overhaul of Hong Kong just a day before the meeting. Beijing, for its part, barred Tesla cars from Chinese military complexes over spying concerns, which Elon Musk refuted.
What is slightly different this time around is the bluntness with which China’s diplomats expressed their disdain for US policy. The wolf warrior diplomacy that countered Donald Trump’s assertiveness is now thinly disguised as consternation, laced with subtle insults.
It’s always been clear that China isn’t going to do what it perceives that the US wants. From China’s perspective, unless the US treats it with “respect” (the code word for not bringing up Xinjiang, Hong Kong, or Taiwan), relations won’t get much better. However, relations have largely persisted in the past despite these very same issues.
And a complaint that the US did not observe diplomatic protocol and went over time in its remarks is hardly new. Unlike chess, there’s no time keeper at these meetings. Time creep is not uncommon, and it’s also a tactic for controlling the narrative.
Far greater diplomatic slights occurred when president Barack Obama first visited president Hu Jintao in 2009. After already signalling he would continue his predecessor George W. Bush’s “soft” stance on China (Obama even put off a meeting with the Dalai Lama as a nod to Beijing), his remarks while meeting Chinese students were censored. Hu didn’t even answer questions during a customary heads-of-state press conference. Relations were described afterwards as “rocky”. And still, relations persisted.
None of what happened in Anchorage is illustrative of what may come next, now that the cameras are off. What was discussed behind closed doors, where the real negotiations took place, remains unclear.
But this much is fairly certain: the US will continue to build on its alliances, strengthen relations with India, and use its post-Covid-19 economic surge as an incentive for countries to cooperate. Tariffs and sanctions will remain in place.
For its part, Beijing will ignore the world’s human rights concerns, continue to militarise the South China Sea, sell itself as the protector of free trade, and leverage the promise of its growing market to make political gains.
Even on issues where agreement may be easier, the plot gets confusing. Xinhua reported that a decision on a joint working group on climate change was made in Alaska. Blinken’s statement merely said that “on climate, our interests intersect”. This type of talking past each other is also, unfortunately, not new.
What we’re left with is guarded pragmatism on both sides where not much changes, diplomatic relations remain intact, and talks are likely to lead to more talking. That’s about as much success as the bilateral relationship can handle at the moment.
US-China relations: how superpower cooperation in three areas can overcome Alaska acrimony
Despite the fire and fury on display at their recent meeting, both sides have ample reason to explore a ‘grand bargain’
They must address the trade and tech wars, rising military tensions and existential threats such as climate change and Covid-19 .
“Tell me who your enemy is, and I will tell you who you are,” German jurist Carl Schmitt said, since ultimately “political actions and motives” boil down to the distinction “between friend and enemy”.
The much-anticipated meeting in Anchorage, Alaska between the scions of the Chinese and American foreign policy establishment exhibited a similar dynamic. As feared, both sides adopted fiery rhetoric in their opening session in front of the global media, reflecting the immense geopolitical gulf separating them.
For the United States, this was about reasserting its claim to global leadership amid rising anti-China sentiment at home. Meanwhile, China’s representatives made it clear they would not accept second place to their American counterparts amid rising nationalism at home.
Nonetheless, both superpowers have ample reason to explore a realistic “grand bargain” in the near future to avoid a devastating conflict as well as jointly address shared global concerns – from the Covid-19 pandemic to climate change.
Following four years of disruptive geopolitics under the Trump administration, there were hopes for a reset in Sino-American relations under the new American leadership.
US President Joe Biden’s administration, which coincides with the return of veterans of the US national security establishment, boosted prospects of responsible statesmanship. China reportedly reached out shortly after November’s election, paving the way for the Alaska meeting barely two months into Biden’s presidency.
Beijing made clear it hoped the high-level exchange would help “get China-US relations back on track”. It’s telling that Beijing dispatched Politburo member Yang Jiechi, China’s top foreign policy official and a former ambassador to Washington, as well as Foreign Minister Wang Yi, a top Asia hand and former ambassador to Japan.
For its part, the US chose Biden’s “alter ego”, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, as well as the golden boy of the Democratic Party establishment, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan. Instead of a smooth reset in bilateral relations, however, the acrimonious meeting revealed how rising geopolitical tensions are more structural than just a product of Donald Trump’s inept statesmanship.
During the meeting, even veteran diplomats couldn’t resist “wolf warrior” stunts and cold war-style posturing. Worryingly, top diplomats from both sides seemed to be playing as much to their domestic political audiences as to their global allies.
No wonder both sides struggled to even agree on a joint statement following several closed-door sessions and lengthy meetings, which extended beyond the original schedule. In many ways, we are grappling with an undeclared “new cold war” between the US and China.
The meeting in Alaska, however, only reinforces the importance of institutionalised management of Sino-American tensions and the need for a reasonable and mutually acceptable grand bargain. There are three main areas where the two superpowers have sufficient room for cooperation and reciprocal compromise.
First, there is a need to address the escalating trade and tech wars, which have disrupted global supply chains and undermined economic recovery. Trump-era sanctions against Chinese “national champions” have hurt, among others, the automobile industry as chip shortages threaten even multinational industries for the foreseeable future.
Also, US sanctions on Chinese social media platforms have led to social disruption and limited people-to-people communication between the superpowers. China’s retaliatory tariffs, meanwhile, have hurt US farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Biden administration has paused some of these sanctions, namely on TikTok and WeChat. However, the two sides need a sustainable trade and tech agreement to avoid relapsing into full-fledged economic warfare.
As China indicated, there is room for compromise. For instance, Beijing could consider certain modifications to its “Made in China 2025” industrial policy. This could involve greater transparency and cooperation in cutting-edge technologies, especially 5G telecommunications and artificial intelligence, coupled with verifiable reassurances against systematic corporate espionage.
In exchange, Washington could reverse blacklisting some of China’s national champions and big tech platforms, easing exports of sensitive technology, as Beijing reverses its own retaliatory sanctions and reconsiders any potential restrictions on rare earth exports. The alternative to a compromise would be an inexorable march towards trade decoupling and a “digital iron curtain” with devastating effects on the world economy.
The second area of much-needed cooperation concerns rising military tensions, especially in the western Pacific and China’s adjacent waters. As both sides expand their naval footprint in the South China Sea, for instance, there is greater need for regular military-to-military diplomacy at the highest levels coupled with appropriate crisis-management mechanisms to avoid unwanted escalation.
Given the growing role of both Chinese and US forces in Asia’s contested waters, the two superpowers need to involve civilian maritime forces in any crisis-prevention mechanism, including the establishment of bilateral hotlines and institutionalised dialogue among relevant agencies. The Biden administration can also consider inviting China back to multilateral naval exercises while co-organising joint naval drills with Asian partners such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Sino-American cooperation is indispensable to addressing existential challenges, from climate change to the Covid-19 pandemic. Both sides are moving towards becoming carbon-neutral economies by the middle of the century, but there is much room for diplomatic and technological cooperation in terms of climate change adaptation and mitigation mechanisms under the aegis of the Paris Agreement.
There is also an urgent need to end “vaccine nationalism” and competitive “vaccine diplomacy”. The US and China can instead jointly expand their assistance to the World Health Organization and global vaccine initiatives such as Covax, thus expediting vaccine roll-out in poorer nations and avoiding the emergence of more lethal Covid-19 variants.
It is clear that despite the fire and fury displayed at the Alaska meeting, the US and China have a golden opportunity to defy Schmitt’s “us versus them” mindset for the broader benefit of the world.
Despite the sniping, Alaska talks show that China and US do seek more constructive relations
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The Chinese delegation led by Yang Jiechi (centre), director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office and Wang Yi (centre left), China’s Foreign Minister, speak with their US counterparts at the opening session of US-China talks at the Captain Cook Hotel in Anchorage, Alaska on March 18, 2021. Photo: AFP |
Lessons from the Alaska summit: both the US and China must rethink their diplomacy
Alaska summit: China and US far apart on hot-button issues but agree to set up climate change group as talks end
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| Yang Jiechi (centre) and Wang Yi (left) led the Chinese delegation in Anchorage, Alaska. Photo: AFP |
