Washington’s Venezuela raid has resurrected old fears about ‘spheres of influence’, sounding alarm bells for Southeast Asian autonomy
The United States’ military operation in Venezuela, culminating in the capture and removal of President Nicolas Maduro, might at first have appeared distant to Southeast Asia. What should concern the region, however, is not geography but the logic underpinning Washington’s action: a growing willingness to act unilaterally, in this case undermining sovereignty and invoking presidential powers to justify the use of force against a perceived threat.
More troubling still, it dusts off the old geopolitical idea of “spheres of influence”. This notion harks back to a time when major powers “staked out” zones of control, constraining the autonomy of weaker states. Indeed, the latest US National Security Strategy (NSS) explicitly commits Washington to “reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine” – a foreign policy position from 1823 associated with US military dominance that frames the western hemisphere as a privileged security space – through what it terms a “Trump Corollary”.
Spheres of influence are established when major powers carve up areas according to their interests, sometimes respecting each other’s spheres so as to reduce the chance of disputes or conflict. In the Venezuela episode, no other power directly challenged Washington’s assertion of a sphere of influence in the western hemisphere, where US military power is unparalleled. China has publicly voiced its opposition, but it is unlikely to actively challenge US President Donald Trump in this instance.
Such an uncontested declaration of a sphere of influence is rare in modern history. When it does occur, other powers must decide whether to cede ground. Historically, many of these arrangements were codified through negotiation. In 1869, for instance, Russia assured Britain that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of influence, an understanding later formalised in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which effectively divided Persia into British and Russian zones.
Washington’s action in Venezuela has therefore resurrected Southeast Asia’s fears about spheres of influence closer to home. But it is unlikely that the US could unilaterally establish such a sphere anywhere in Asia without China challenging the move. In any case, the latest NSS was more equivocal about Asia than it was the Americas, stating only that the US sought to “successfully compete” against China in the Indo-Pacific.
China is similarly unlikely to declare an exclusive sphere of influence in Asia simply because the US, with its network of regional alliances, is unlikely to yield. Even as China deepens its influence through increased economic engagement, regional states have consistently resisted exclusive alignment with Beijing. Southeast Asian countries have sought to preserve their strategic autonomy through diversification, making true dominance or control by any great power over our hemisphere implausible.
A greater danger lies in the possibility of a US-China compact to divvy up the region into respective spheres of influence. Such a “G2” concept is not new. As early as 2007, a Chinese general proposed to a US admiral that the two powers divide responsibilities in the Pacific, with the US operating east of Hawaii and China to the west. In 2023, Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested to then US secretary of state Antony Blinken that the planet was big enough to “accommodate the respective development and common prosperity” of both countries.
More recently, Fudan University scholar Wu Xinbo wrote about a “grand bargain” in which China would continue to buy US bonds to support the dollar’s value in return for Washington stopping its containment efforts and reaffirming the one-China policy.
For Southeast Asia, the strategic consequences of a G2 pact would be serious. As political scientists William Hurst and Peter Trubowitz have noted, any such deal would require US concessions on Taiwan and the South China Sea. This would unravel a security architecture that has underpinned regional stability for decades.
A grand bargain over Taiwan could enable Beijing to project power into the South China Sea, where several Southeast Asian states have overlapping claims. A concurrent bargain on the disputed waterway could see the US scaling back joint exercises and freedom of navigation operations, with knock-on effects for claimant states such as Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Although a G2 is unlikely, Trump’s instincts lend some plausibility to the concept. He is allergic to multilateralism, prefers transactional deals that advantage the US and is reportedly set to visit Beijing in April amid what has arguably been a “tactical pause” in the US-China rivalry.
Neither has the US president been openly supportive of Tokyo in its recent diplomatic dispute with Beijing, perhaps because he is concerned that this would jeopardise a trade deal struck with China in October.
Still, none of this means that a G2 is likely. China has shown little enthusiasm for the idea – particularly if it casts Beijing as the junior partner – and the concept itself remains woolly and undefined.
For now, Trump appears to be more focused on securing an economic deal with China. Moreover, the NSS asserts Washington’s desire to build, together with its allies, a “military capable of denying aggression” in the so-called first island chain off China’s coast. This would demand greater defence spending and capability development in Asia, directly contradicting the idea of a G2. The same US security strategy notes that a “hostile power” (presumably China) could one day control the South China Sea by imposing a maritime “toll system” to “close or open” the waterway and regulate passage “at will”, which would be harmful to US interests.
Undoubtedly, a US-China G2 would not be in Southeast Asia’s best interests. But given the uncertain state of play and lack of coordination between Washington and Beijing, regional capitals can breathe a tentative sigh of collective relief – for now.
William Choong is a Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Managing Editor at Fulcrum. Joanne Lin is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Asean Studies Centre at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This article was first published on the institute’s commentary website fulcrum.sg.
