Damascus views engagement with Beijing as a pathway to legitimacy, leverage – and the US$216 billion it needs to rebuild
Early this month, Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani is expected in Beijing for what both sides have billed as a “reset” in relations. The move reflects a wider trend across the Middle East, where governments wary of Western conditionality are increasingly seeking what they view as less encumbered partnerships with China.
The winds of realpolitik are sweeping from the Middle East to Central and South Asia, bringing “hard resets” across entire regions. India’s quiet pivot towards the Taliban and Russia’s renewed rapprochement in Syria and Afghanistan signal a world in flux.
When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa took the podium at the 80th United Nations General Assembly in September, it was more than a diplomatic debut; it was the first speech by a Syrian head of state in nearly 60 years.
Sharaa’s message was direct: Syria wants recognition, investment and the end of sanctions. But his overtures extended beyond the West.
Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has made clear that Syria views China as indispensable to its reconstruction
In recent months, Damascus has been looking towards Beijing, dispatching envoys and indicating a broader reorientation of its foreign policy towards the East. China’s strategy of “balanced vagueness” towards Syria suggests that engagement with the new leadership, dominated by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, once labelled a terrorist organisation, will be slow and driven by a careful weighing of risks and opportunities.
From a Syrian standpoint, Shaibani’s priorities in Beijing are straightforward: economic and counterterrorism cooperation. He has made clear that Syria views China as indispensable to its reconstruction, an effort the World Bank estimates will cost US$216 billion.
Neighbouring nations are already taking a leading role in Syria’s reconstruction. Saudi Arabia has pledged US$6.4 billion in investments focusing on infrastructure, real estate and information technology. Turkey is spearheading efforts to rebuild power plants, roads and ports, and Qatar has signed a US$7 billion energy deal. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has moved swiftly with a US$800 million agreement to manage the strategic port of Tartus.
Even under former Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Damascus held high hopes for large-scale Chinese investment following reconstruction and trade summits in 2018. At the time, Chinese state-owned enterprises pledged around US$2 billion and bilateral trade reached US$1.3 billion in 2019. However, despite China’s provision of medical supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic, its overall economic engagement fell short of Syrian expectations. A similar pattern may be emerging now.
Beijing’s own demands are on the table since Shi Hongwei, China’s ambassador in Damascus, met Sharaa. Syria may rank low on Beijing’s list of Middle Eastern priorities, but the uncertainty radiating from Damascus carries risks that cannot be ignored.
The spectre of terrorist networks exploiting the chaos and the possibility of that threat spilling from the Middle East into Central Asia, China’s near abroad, is stirring unease in Beijing.
At the heart of China’s anxiety lies the presence of Uygur foreign fighters embedded within Syria’s defence apparatus. The newly formed Division 84 is reportedly designed to absorb foreign combatants into the Syrian army and eventually Syrian society – families included. Among them are an estimated 3,500 battle-hardened Uygur fighters from the Turkestan Islamic Party.
While these forces may not pose an immediate threat to China or Central Asia, their continued presence, and Sharaa’s declared support for a group that spilled blood to assure his victory on the battlefield, have Beijing on edge. It was no coincidence that Chinese envoy Fu Cong recently warned the UN Security Council that foreign terrorist fighters remained active in Syria and urged Damascus to meet its counterterrorism obligations.
Still, this month’s diplomatic mission itself marks an important step forward for Syria’s new government, in a moment where symbolism may matter as substance. For Sharaa’s administration, engagement with China offers a pathway to legitimacy and leverage, and a means of signalling that Syria is not entirely beholden to Turkey.
For Beijing, deepening ties with Damascus fits neatly with its long-term strategy to broaden its footprint in the Middle East. At the same time, Chinese diplomats are watching Ankara closely. Turkey has emerged as the new regional kingmaker, wielding growing influence through its early backing of Sharaa, its military presence along Syria’s northern border, and its pledge to train and arm the new Syrian army.
Amid simmering tensions between Israel and Iran, a renewed outbreak of violence is a possibility that cannot be ignored. In this volatile context, stability and sustainable development in Syria have become essential, not only to prevent sectarian flare-ups against the country’s minorities but also to contain potential ripple effects that could spread across Iraq and other regions central to China’s energy security.
Whether this emerging partnership will lead to meaningful reconstruction remains uncertain. Yet even a fragile regional balance could reopen the door for China’s return, allowing Beijing to move beyond symbolic diplomacy and deploy its preferred foreign policy instrument: investment.
One thing is clear, however. As the old order in the Middle East continues to fracture, Syria’s eastward gaze reflects more than a tactical pivot; it embodies a shifting global balance of power and a quiet acknowledgement that the path back to relevance no longer runs only through Western support.
Dr Alessandro Arduino is an affiliate lecturer at the Lau China Institute, King’s College London, specialising in the convergence of technological innovation and national security.
